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The Last Britons? Young Muslims and national identity 
Paul Thomas , School of Education and Professional Development, University of 
Huddersfield : d.p.thomas@hud.ac.uk 
Abstract 
Current policy agendas around Community Cohesion (Cantle,2001) and ‘Preventing 
Violent Extremism’(DCLG, 2007a) have arguably viewed Muslim communities as 
disconnected from, and even antagonistic to,  ‘British’ identity, a feeling exacerbated 
by popular media discourse around the 7/7 London bombings, subsequent terror 
plots, and Muslim community opposition to what ‘Britain’ is doing in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. This all suggests a heightened, supranational ‘Muslim’ identity 
incompatible with ‘British’ affiliation, a situation apparently made possible by naive, 
liberal ‘multiculturalist’ policies (Phillips, 2005; Prins and Salisbury, 2008). This paper 
draws on empirical research amongst  young people in Oldham and Rochdale to 
argue that, in fact,  Muslim young people, whilst indeed sharing a heightened 
religious identity, do not see this ‘Muslim’ identity as incompatible with ‘Britishness’. 
Britishness is actually seen by these young people as more positive and inclusive 
than ‘English’ identity, something viewed as the preserve of White people. This is a  
problematic situation in a context where the White young people surveyed view 
‘English’ identity as more relevant and appropriate than ‘British’, an understandable 
development in the context of the devolution and associated growths in national 
identity in Wales and Scotland. Are we now in the situation where young non-white 
English people are the ‘last Britons’, accepting this British national identity in ways 
that their parental generation never did just as this identity is consigned to history? 
 
Introduction 
Over the past few years, the ‘identity’, loyalty and affiliations of British Muslims, 
particularly the younger generations, has come under repeated scrutiny. The serious 
urban disturbances in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in the summer of 2001 all 
involved Pakistani and Bangladeshi young men clashing with the police, and at times 
with White racists. The resulting governmental inquiries (Cantle, 2001; Denham, 
2001) suggested that such disturbances and the ethnic segregation and tension they 
revealed were symptomatic of wider national realities. The analysis here was that 
profound physical and cultural ethnic segregation had led to ‘parallel lives’ (Ritchie, 
2001) and a lack of shared identities or values. Within this Community Cohesion 
analysis and policy prescription (LGA, 2002; Home Office, 2005) was an explicit 
suggestion that the Asian communities under scrutiny lacked a commitment to or 
engagement with national institutions or identities (Cantle, 2001). One clear result 
was a  renewed debate around ‘Britishness’ and the need to promote it, something 
given added urgency by the international and domestic terrorist atrocities of 9/11 and 
the 7/7 London bombings of July 2005. The latter events, suicide bombings carried 
out by young British Muslims, seemed to confirm all the fears held in some political 
quarters about the profound alienation from ‘Britishness’ amongst a significant 
portion of such young British Muslims. A number of subsequent terror plots and 
convictions, all similarly involving young Muslims, suggests support of this 
perspective, and has led the Government to launch the ‘Preventing Violent 
Extremism’ initiative (DCLG, 2007a;Thomas, 2009), a ‘hearts and minds’ educational 
approach aimed explicitly at young Muslims within the wider ‘CONTEST’ counter-
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terrorism strategy. These developments all suggest that there is a profound problem 
with ‘British’ identity amongst young Muslims, which is, bluntly, that they are not 
British enough, and that a significant proportion of young British Muslims are actively 
hostile to British identify, values and policies. Such a position claims that misguided 
policies of ‘multiculturalism’ have allowed separate and oppositional ethnic/religious 
identities to strengthen and cement at the expense of over-arching and collective 
national identities, so weakening the country ( Prins and Salisbury, 2008). This paper 
explores such claims, drawing on empirical evidence from field research amongst 
young people in the Oldham and Rochdale areas of Greater Manchester, to discuss 
whether there are really any grounds for suggesting that young Muslims do not feel 
British. 
Not British Enough? 
The 2001 disturbances have proved to be a watershed for policy approaches to ‘race 
relations’ (Solomos, 2003). Community Cohesion has emerged from obscurity to 
rapidly become the clear priority for policy (Home Office, 2005). A number of themes 
can be detected within Community Cohesion, the most important of them being the 
damaging effects of physical and cultural ethnic segregation (Cantle, 2001). The 
implicit suggestions that ‘segregation’ is in itself damaging and that it is getting worse 
are highly contested (Finney and Simpson, 2009;Flint and Robinson, 2008), but it is 
beyond dispute that there is significant ethnic segregation in many of Britain’s towns 
and cities, and that young people experience this as a real and negative constriction 
on their lives (Back, 1996;Thomas, 2003).The result of this is a lack of shared 
understandings, values and experiences, with communities having little meaningful 
contact with each other, and the result being separate ‘identities’ and priorities. 
Consistent with wider New Labour social policy (Levitas, 2005), a communitarianist 
analysis is applied here by government, with agency blamed for accepting and so 
deepening these ‘parallel lives’, and government unable to overcome this 
segregation without the active involvement and will of individuals and communities. 
Inherent to this Community Cohesion analysis is the belief that past ‘race relations’ 
priorities, especially those post-1981 developments popularly understood as ‘anti-
racism’ or equal opportunities, have had the unintended consequence of making this 
situation worse by emphasising and prioritising ‘difference’ rather than commonality. 
Here, the post-1981 acceptance of the reality and force of structural racism and 
racial inequality led policy makers at the national and local level to focus on equality 
and ‘appropriate’ facilities and provision for each separate ethnic group, rather than 
on common needs and issues. Clearly, the availability of ethnic monitoring data 
detailing the position of and outcomes for each separate ethnic group supported 
such developments. For advocates of Community Cohesion, this policy direction cast 
aside  the parallel priority of early ‘race relations’ approaches, that of ‘promoting 
good relations’ between different groups: ‘equality’ for each group was prioritised 
over unity and commonality (Cantle, 2005). Whilst some would see this as an 
unintended consequence of policy, others saw it as a deliberate divide and rule tactic 
of encouraging ethnic separatism, with echoes of colonial rule. The result was that 
the focus on each separate ethnic community, its needs and facilities, undermined 
cross-ethnic alliances against racial inequality, and inspired a clear growth in 
separate ethno-religious identities, rather than over-arching national, or the 
solidarity-based identities of ‘Black’ or ‘Asian’(Kundnani, 2007). This narrative 
provides an explanation for the apparent growth in ‘Muslim’ identity amongst 
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Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities that is in conflict, from some perspectives 
(Prins and Salisbury, 2008) with a ‘British’ identity. 
  
Arguably, the Community Cohesion reports (Cantle, 2001; Denham, 2001) and the 
accompanying political discourse (Travis, 2001) echoed such a perspective through 
some of their language and focus, such as Cantle’s call: 
for the minority, largely non-white community, to develop a greater 
acceptance of, and engagement with, the principal national institutions. 
(Cantle, 2001:19) 
and in its focus on the universal use of English, and focus on equal rights and 
opportunities for women (Cantle, 2001: 5.1.11 and 5.1.13 respectively), and on 
‘cultural practices’ (Denham, 2001:20), a term that only ever seems to be applied to 
ethnic minority groups (Alexander, 2004). Accompanied by suggestions of ‘self 
segregation’ (Ouseley, 2001), some critics saw this Community Cohesion discourse 
as representing the suggestion that ethnic minorities, especially Muslim communities 
had chosen isolation and separate identities, with the answer being an enforced 
assimilationism (Kalra, 2002;Alexander, 2004). The fact that Britain’s leading ‘official’ 
Equality advocate declared Britain to be ‘sleep-walking to segregation’ and that 
‘multiculturalism’ was to blame (Phillips, 2005) seemed to make this perspective of 
dangerous, separate identities and the need to overcome them official. 
Accompanying the development of this Community Cohesion perspective and its 
operationalisation (Home Office, 2005;2007) has been a continued government 
concern with ‘Britishness’ and the need to promote it, the very debating of which 
could be seen to suggest that some British citizens are currently not ‘British 
enough’(Kundnani,2007). 
This political concern with  the ‘separate identity’ of Muslim communities has been 
given a much sharper focus by the terrorist bombings and failed attempts of July 
2005 and by subsequent plots and convictions. The political response has included 
the Preventing Violent Extremism initiative aimed at Muslim communities generally, 
and at young Muslims in particular. Whilst small numbers only of Muslim young 
people have been involved in these plots , the PVE policy agenda focuses squarely 
on Muslim communities as a whole, with Government insisting on PVE activity in all 
Local Authority areas having a Muslim population of 4,000 people or more (Thomas, 
2009). Within those communities, the programme is aimed at those most at risk of 
recruitment or ‘grooming’ by extremists, or at those ‘justifying or glorifying violent 
extremist ideologies and terrorism’ (DCLGa, 2007:7). Whilst many of the PVE 
documents go out of their way to talk about a ‘minority of extremists’ and to highlight 
the government’s work with the Muslim ‘mainstream’, other language and 
approaches appear to contradict this: The key measure of success will be 
demonstrable changes in attitudes among Muslims, and wider communities they are 
part of, locally and nationally (DCLG, 2007c:7). The fact that the government’s initial, 
‘light touch’ evaluation of the first year of PVE activity (DCLG, 2008) talks proudly of 
working with almost 44,000 people, the large majority of them young Muslims, 
suggests a much broader concern with and focus on the ‘Identity’ of young British 
Muslims 
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Empirical Data 
The policy developments and discourse outlined above suggest an urgent need to 
know more about how Muslim young people view ‘Britishness’, and how this relates 
both to other forms of identity relevant to them, and to how other young people feel 
about national identity. The evidence base is limited here, with previous research 
amongst young adults , admittedly in an area with a limited Muslim population, 
suggesting that young people of all ethnic and social backgrounds are indifferent, or 
even hostile, to national identity (Fenton, 2007). Other surveys amongst adults have 
suggested stronger support for ‘Britishness’ rather than ‘Englishness’ amongst non-
White ethnic minorities, but were too small-scale to make firm judgements (CRE, 
2005). As a response to this need, the School of Education and Professional 
Development, University of Huddersfield initiated the Youth Identity Research 
Project, with the aim of carrying out investigating young peoples’ experiences and 
understandings of ‘Identity’, cohesion and ethnic segregation. 
 The case study area for this Project was Oldham and Rochdale, Greater 
Manchester, building on longstanding links between the University and these 
neighbouring areas. Both Oldham and Rochdale have significant Muslim populations 
from a Pakistani and Bangladeshi background, with this inward migration in the 
1960s and 1970s being due to the textile industry. The decimation of this industry 
(with jobs, ironically, often moving to South Asia) has left significant social exclusion 
and poverty for all ethnic communities in the area, and both towns face significant 
ethnic segregation, using the ‘index of dissimilarity’, and racial tension. The project 
employed an action research  approach, working in partnership with youth work 
agencies to train youth workers in research approaches and to devise a range of 
qualitative research approaches appropriate for the wide range of abilities of young 
people aged 13-19 years old engaged by such projects and clubs. These 
approaches included individual and group interviews, word and sentence association 
exercises, questionnaires, and an ‘Identity ranking’ exercise, whereby young people 
were asked to rank in order of importance to them  forms of identity , such as 
‘religion’, ‘ethnicity’,’ British’, ‘English’, and local/town identity. In total, over 800 
young people took part in one form or other of research activity and  generating 
significant amount of data of various types, much of which is still be analysed. For 
the purpose of this article, the data focussed on is that resulting from the ‘Identity 
ranking’ exercise, and the section of the questionnaire relating to the issue of ‘proud 
to be British?’, plus some of the qualitative material stemming  the word association 
and sentence completion exercises focus on ‘British?’ and ‘English people are...?’ 
In utilising the existing relationship between youth workers and young people, the 
Youth Identity Project hoped to maximise the openness and honesty of young 
people, whilst aware of the dangers of conformity and compliance in any group-
based research process (Albrecht et al, 1993). Youth Work’s historic focus on 
disadvantaged young people has been sharpened by the ‘social exclusion’ focus of 
the current New Labour Government (Mizen, 2004), meaning that any Youth Work-
based research process will over-represent socially excluded young people and 
communities. This might be seen to ‘skew’ any data, but arguably issues of 
alienation from national identity, or attraction to aggressive and oppositional counter 
identities, whether Islamic or White racial supremacist, are precisely related to young 
people and communities who have ‘lost’ from the economic re-structuring of post-
industrial globalisation (May, 1999). The key findings relevant to the issue of ‘British’ 
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identity and Muslim young people are reported below, with the following ‘Discussion’ 
section examining the meaning of this data. 
Clear differences emerged in the type of identity seen as important by young people. 
Virtually all of the Pakistani/ Bangladeshi-origin young people involved in the 
research saw their Muslim religion as the form of identity most important to them but, 
for the large majority of them, this Islamic identity is not incompatible with British 
national identity – the overwhelming majority of young Muslims were happy to 
identify themselves as ‘British Muslim’ or ‘British Asian’. The fact that a smaller 
number of Asian young people were prepared to say that they are ‘Proud to be 
British’ can be related to their concern with, and criticisms of, domestic racism and 
British foreign policy positions. The emphasis of Asian young people on ‘British’ 
rather than ‘English’ national identity was in clear contrast to the views of White 
young people, who clearly favoured ‘English’ identity. 
The importance of ‘Muslim’ Identity 
Islam/faith was seen as the most important form of identity for all Asian young 
people taking part (consistent with other research nationally, and in strong contrast 
to all other ethnic/faith backgrounds). This clearly gave a lot of Muslim young people 
a strong and positive sense of identity: Pakistani Muslim... I’m a very strong believer 
in all religious rules (AYP, Rochdale); British Muslim – I’m very religious (AYP, 
Rochdale) 
 Respondents were asked to rank eight possible labels that for the sources of 
their identity: British, English, their local town, their ethnicity, their status as a 
Northerner, their religion, their local area within the town, or their status as a 
European.  One of the clearest distinctions between the different identified ethnic 
groups was the significance of religion as a source of identity.  Self-ascribed ethnic 
categories were grouped together to facilitate meaningful comparison, and 
responses ranking identity factors 1 or 2 were also aggregated to allow for those with 
a shared religious/national identity to emerge.  The findings are given below in the 
Table: 
Table: Significance of religious and national identity for different groups 
 
 
Self-ascribed ethnicity Rank 
Religion  
1 or 2 (%) 
Rank 
English  
1 or 2 
(%) 
Rank 
British 
1 or 2 
(%) 
White British, English, White, White English, 
White Christian, British (N=57) 
7 75 56
Asian Pakistani, British Muslim, Pakistani 
Kashmiri, Pakistani, British Asian, 
Bangladeshi/Bengali, British Bengali, British 
Asian (N=54) 
93 3 20
Black African, Black British, Mixed Race, Other 
(N=16) 
44 56 44
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This finding represents a qualification to the positive responses given to the finding 
that the Muslim sample was proud to be British, in that it is clear that for this group, 
unlike their counterparts, religious identity trumps national identity 
 
‘Britishness’ and Englishness 
For the majority of Muslim young people, this primary faith-based identity was 
compatible with being ‘British’ (contrary to alarmist suggestions of anti-Britishness 
amongst Muslim young people): British: Me (AYP: Rochdale).  63% of those self-
identifying as ‘Muslim’ definitely agreed with the statement ‘I am proud to say that I 
am British’(less than the 80% of the ‘non-Muslim’ group), and only 10% definitely 
disagreed, indicating that misgivings about foreign policy frequently expressed in the 
group discussions did not have an alienating effect on the majority of Muslim young 
people: 
 
British mean live with different people  
British means loving your country  
British means being loyal to England and not being a terrorist and blowing it 
up  
British means you can be multi-cultured yet keep your identity  
(Asian young people, Rochdale) 
 
For Asian young people Britishness is more positive than Englishness: I suppose 
because British is more inclusive, that’s how people can relate to that more than just 
the St George flag (AYP, Rochdale).  This could be a function of Britishness being 
associated with ideas about inclusive citizenship, as expressed in this word 
association 
British means you live in Britain, abiding laws, treating each other respectfully, 
a citizen of Britain, having rights in Britain 
By contrast, Englishness appeared to be more associated with socio-cultural traits: 
the last respondent identified English people as: sometimes racist, to blame for the 
war on Iraq, good at football, good cricketers, to blame for street crime, and in the 
following example, ‘Englishness’ is seen more negatively, as it is viewed as  being 
about ‘being White’. 
English people are the opposite of us  
English people are White people  
           (Asian Young People, Rochdale) 
 
This is clearly problematic, as most White young people see ‘English’ as a more 
important identity than ‘British’, as is indicated in the Table above. This focus on 
‘Englishness’ amongst White young people may well reflect the challenges to past 
notions of ‘Britishness’ posed by devolution, European Integration and inward 
migration.  
 
Impact of Foreign Affairs 
Despite their acceptance of ‘British’ national identity, the British involvement in 
western military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and domestic media and political 
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discussion of them, has had a clear impact on some Asian young people view 
national identity: 
British means attacking other countries  
Muslim people are targeted, victimised  
English people are to blame for the war in Iraq  
(Asian Young People, Rochdale) 
 
The impact of Islamaphobia and anti-Muslim sentiments related to these 
international political events amongst some sections of British politics and the media 
have also impacted on some Muslim young people, with a number of very thoughtful, 
or even plaintive, comments: 
Muslim people are not terrorists  
Muslim people are misled by extremists as well as world leaders  
(Asian young people, Rochdale) 
 
Problematic ‘Muslim’ Identity 
It is clear from the data above that the strong ‘Muslim’ identity amongst Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi-origin young people surveyed in Oldham and Rochdale is not viewed as 
in conflict with British identity, and that British identity remains strong, and relatively 
unproblematic, for these young people, despite the real and ongoing geo-political 
events taking place. However, this also gave a minority of young British Muslims a 
basis to negatively judge the morals and lifestyles of non-Muslims. The extreme 
negativity and prejudices towards White people from some Asian young people was 
often expressed in judgemental moral or religious terms, suggesting that the 
religious identity seen by all Muslim young people was being used by a minority to 
judge and label others in highly disrespectful ways, with terms such as ‘drunkenness’ 
and ‘godless’ being utilised, as this excerpt from the exercise completed by one 
youth group in Rochdale shows: 
White people: Shameless, not believing in God, no respect for other people 
 
Such prejudices were particularly exposed by the ‘Word Association/Sentence 
Completion’ exercises, with responses suggesting that racist language and 
stereotypes are part of ‘everyday’ life for some young people of all ethnic 
backgrounds. Here, the evidence would support the view of the Community 
Cohesion reports (Cantle, 2001;Ritchie, 2001) that within largely segregated 
communities who have at best superficial links with individuals of a different 
background, overt prejudices and negative language can become part of the open 
and ‘taken for granted’ way of acting and thinking. 
 
 A strong ‘Muslim’ sense of Identity meant that the perceived position of Muslims 
nationally and internationally and emotive political issues, such as the Iraq and 
Afghanistan military involvements played a significant role in the way Asian young 
people viewed ‘British’ and ‘English’ identity, as well as the way they understood 
themselves. This suggests that more overt work and discussions with older Muslim 
young people about their identity and its links to political issues like 7/7and the Iraq 
war could be positive as those issues are already at the front of young people’s 
minds. Nationally, most educational work within the PVE/Prevent agenda has 
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avoided such overt engagement with such contentious topics (Thomas, 2009), what 
DCLG Minister Hazel Blears characterised in December 2008 as the ‘sharp end’ of 
the PVE agenda. This evidence suggests that some Muslim young people want and 
need to engage in Citizenship/Political education-based dialogue around these 
issues, as they are already discussing them. It also suggests that inter-faith work 
amongst young people may be a positive vehicle for Cohesion. The strength of 
‘Muslim’ identity amongst Asian-origin young people surveyed, and the level of their 
concern about international political events needs to be also understood in terms of 
how non-Muslim communities have understood such events through political and 
media discourse and ‘projected’ feelings and prejudices about them: the word 
association exercise with ‘Muslim’ produced responses which identified religious 
markers (headscarves, beards, funny clothes, Quran), disapproval of religious 
observance (too strong in their faith), and references to terrorism and the language 
of redtop newspapers (bombs, ragheads).  These were in addition to more timeworn 
references to cultural traits and the size of the population. The strength and 
regularity of such prejudiced comments from some White young people highlighted 
the ‘taken for granted’ status of such opinions within some White communities, and 
the influence of racist campaigning organisations in these areas (Copsey, 2008). 
 
Discussion 
At first sight, the case study evidence discussed above from Oldham and Rochdale 
might seem to support the right-of-centre thesis that there is indeed a problem with 
Muslim young people and national identity. The overwhelming importance put on 
‘religion’ by the Asian young people surveyed leaves no doubt about the fact the 
‘Muslims’ is first and foremost what they see themselves as. The strength and 
consistency of this religious identity explains the deeply-felt concern in Britain’s 
South Asian communities with Britain’s role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with the 
West’s failure to rein in Israel’s illegal excesses in Gaza and on the West Bank – 
these are understood as attacks on fellow Muslims and upon Muslim countries. This 
is, of course, very interesting in itself, because this association and concern with 
Palestine (itself a misnomer, as a significant number of Palestinians are Christian) 
and other Muslim countries was not evident amongst Britain’s Asian communities in 
the 1970s and early 1980s, with the ‘Satanic Verses’ controversy of 1989 arguably 
proving to be a turning point (Abbas, 2005). That is not the focus of this paper, but 
the suggestion that Britain’s Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities feel strong and 
deep attachments to co-religionists in other countries, and that they side with those 
co-religionists against the policies and values of their own nation is the conclusion 
drawn by some commentators (Policy Exchange, 2007; Prins and Salisbury, 2008). 
That view is significantly refuted by this evidence, with Muslim young people in 
exactly the sort of tense, ethnically-segregated and socially excluded northern towns 
seen as capable of producing violent Islamist extremists being entirely comfortable 
with describing themselves as ‘British’. The overwhelming focus on religious identity 
does beg the question of how important national ‘British’ identity is to these young 
Muslims in relation to their ‘religious’ identity, and there clearly needs to be more 
detailed research activity around the relative strengths of these ‘identities’. Also, the 
judgemental nature of some comments about non-Muslims and the language 
sometimes used to express it, suggests that this ‘Muslim’ identity is as a much a 
‘cultural ‘ identity as a an authentically ‘religious’ one. Nevertheless, the very 
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significant support amongst these young Muslims, despite their very real concerns 
about international political events, for the statement ‘I’m proud to be British’ 
suggests that the political and media discourse questioning the national loyalties of 
young British Muslims are badly misplaced. 
Contrary to much of the academic discourse around the meaning of Community 
Cohesion, empirical evidence into how Community Cohesion is actually being 
understood and operationalised  through work with young people in towns like 
Oldham suggests that it is not presaged on assimilationism. Instead, it accepts the 
reality and positive strength of different identities and works with them to create the 
conditions for meaningful direct contact and dialogue that could be laying the 
conditions for positive and common over-arching identities (Thomas, 2007). This 
understandings of the government’s Community Cohesion agenda places it in the 
context of New Labour’s efforts to create de-centred and inter-sectional forms of 
identity through a ‘human rights’ framework (McGhee, 2006). Here, ‘hot’ forms of 
exclusive ethnic, class and religious identities that are inevitably going to be in 
tension with each other in an increasingly fluid and multicultural society need to be 
replaced by ‘cooler’, weaker forms of identity. From this perspective, respect and 
equality between religious and ethnic identities cannot be viewed as progress if 
those identities are intolerant of gay and lesbian lifestyles, or of gender equality. This 
political approach can be seen as a significant departure from previous but recent 
debates on ‘multiculturalism’ which stressed the perspective of a ‘community of 
communities’ (CFMEB, 2000). In contrast, this new focus necessitates a weakening 
of such essentialised ethnic identities and the development of multiple identities, the 
precondition for ‘hybridity’ (Hall, 2000). The fact that the young Muslims surveyed are 
comfortable with a ‘British’ identity alongside their ‘religious’ affiliation might be seen 
as a tentative but positive development in this direction. However, Government 
policy itself here is contradictory, with the PVE agenda developing as a single ethnic 
group focus, itself in flat contradiction to the stated priority of Community Cohesion, 
but one which also essentialises and privileges ‘Muslim’ identity of Britain’s Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi communities, rather than focussing on the other forms of identity 
and need represented in such communities (Thomas, 2009). Here, the government’s 
continued fixation on dialogue with ‘religious’ representatives of ’Muslims’ (albeit of 
the right, pliant sort: Younge, 2009), rather than with the hundreds of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi-origin elected local councillors, MPs, and senior public servants who 
also happen to be Muslims seems to perpetuate ‘hot’ and essentialised forms of 
identity at odds with other aspects of social policy. Arguably, this uncritical 
acceptance of religious claims emboldens the religious-based judgementalism of 
some young Muslims surveyed, which included clear challenges to notions of gender 
equality. 
The other key issue worthy of comment from the initial research findings reported 
here is the contrast between the ‘British’ rather than ‘English’ affiliation of Muslim 
young people, a preference in significant contrast to those of White young people. 
This finding supports the findings of previous, small-scale research amongst ethnic 
minority adults (CRE, 2005), and the associated positive comments about the Union 
Jack contradict research which suggested a preference for the English Cross of St. 
George flag amongst young Pakistanis ( Bagguley and Hussain, 2005), a finding 
possibly skewed by the field research being carried out soon after the 2002 World 
Cup when England flags bedecked the entire country. This  finding has led to this 
Copyright PSA 2009
10 
 
paper’s slightly provocative title. Whilst the idea of young Muslims being the ‘last 
Britons’ somewhat overplays the current reality, there is clearly a genuine issue of 
young Muslims embracing British identity (despite very real political tensions and 
arguments) just as White young people desert this identity in favour of ‘Englishness’. 
Significantly, previous research (CRE, 2005) has identified that non-White ethnic 
minorities in Scotland and Wales are largely comfortable with that form of identity, 
but the data from England was consistent with our own findings that ‘English’ is not 
an identity that non-White ethnic minorities, especially Muslims/Asians, are entirely 
comfortable with. Here, there is an urgent need to debate and develop more 
inclusive, modern and dynamic understandings of ‘Englishness’ that can be 
confidently embraced by ethnic minorities  and which challenges residual, racially- 
exclusive understandings of the type peddled by the far-right BNP (Bragg, 
2007;Copsey,2008). One real ground for optimism here is provided by the 
experience of the travelling army that supports the England football team at all major 
tournaments, with the 2006 World Cup in Germany seeing large numbers of Asian 
and Black fans wearing the white shirt with pride (Perryman, 2008). 
 
Conclusion 
Much of the political and media discourse of the past few years around the real and 
pressing challenges of cohesion and violent political extremism has contained an 
undertow that questions the national loyalties and affiliations of Britain’s Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi communities. The explicit suggestion from some quarters is that 
their ‘Muslim’ identity inevitably puts them in conflict with ‘British values’ (whatever 
they are) and British national interests. The case study evidence reported here from 
field research amongst young people in Oldham and Rochdale confirms the strength 
and primacy of Muslim ‘identity’, but suggests that young Muslims do not see this as 
in contradiction with ‘Britishness’, and that most are ‘proud to be British’. This 
provides significant grounds for optimism, and possibly suggests further progress 
towards de-centred and intersectional forms of ‘identity’. However, the clear contrast 
between the ‘national’ affiliations of Muslim and White young people surveyed raises 
the difficulty of developing a shared national identity that all can be comfortable with 
in rapidly changing political conditions. This suggests the need for a focus on a more 
open, dynamic and non-racial understanding of ‘Englishness’ that can be embraced 
by young people of all ethnic backgrounds. 
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